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Abstract
This paper studies how the linguistic components of
blogposts collected from Sina Weibo, a Chinese mi-
croblogging platform, might affect the blogposts’ likeli-
hood of being censored. Our results go along with King
et al. (2013)’s Collective Action Potential (CAP) theory,
which states that a blogpost’s potential of causing riot or
assembly in real life is the key determinant of it getting
censored. Although there is not a definitive measure of
this construct, the linguistic features that we identify as
discriminatory go along with the CAP theory. We build
a classifier that significantly outperforms non-expert hu-
mans in predicting whether a blogpost will be censored.
The crowdsourcing results suggest that while humans
tend to see censored blogposts as more controversial
and more likely to trigger action in real life than the
uncensored counterparts, they in general cannot make a
better guess than our model when it comes to ‘reading
the mind’ of the censors in deciding whether a blogpost
should be censored. We do not claim that censorship
is only determined by the linguistic features. There are
many other factors contributing to censorship decisions.
The focus of the present paper is on the linguistic form
of blogposts. Our work suggests that it is possible to use
linguistic properties of social media posts to automati-
cally predict if they are going to be censored.
Introduction
In 2019, Freedom in the World1, a yearly survey produced
by Freedom House2 that measures the degree of civil liber-
ties and political rights in every nation, recorded the 13th
consecutive year of decline in global freedom. This de-
cline spans across long-standing democracies such as USA
as well as authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia.
“Democracy is in retreat. The offensive against freedom of
expression is being supercharged by a new and more effec-
tive form of digital authoritarianism." According to the re-
port, China is now exporting its model of comprehensive in-
ternet censorship and surveillance around the world, offering
Copyright c© 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
1https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/
democracy-in-retreat
2https://freedomhouse.org/
trainings, seminars, and even study trips as well as advanced
equipment.
In this paper, we deal with a particular type of censorship
– when a post gets removed from a social media platform
semi-automatically based on its content. We are interested in
exploring whether there are systematic linguistic differences
between posts that get removed by censors from Sina Weibo,
a Chinese microblogging platform, and the posts that remain
on the website. Sina Weibo was launched in 2009 and be-
came the most popular social media platform in China. Sina
Weibo has over 431 million monthly active users3.
In cooperation with the ruling regime, Weibo sets strict
control over the content published under its service (Tager,
Bass, and Lopez 2018). According to Zhu et al. (2013),
Weibo uses a variety of strategies to target censorable posts,
ranging from keyword list filtering to individual user moni-
toring. Among all posts that are eventually censored, nearly
30% of them are censored within 5–30 minutes, and nearly
90% within 24 hours (Zhu et al. 2013). We hypothesize that
the former are done automatically, while the latter are re-
moved by human censors.
Research shows that some of the censorship decisions are
not necessarily driven by the criticism of the state (King,
Pan, and Roberts 2013), the presence of controversial top-
ics (Ng, Feldman, and Leberknight 2018; Ng et al. 2018), or
posts that describe negative events (Ng et al. 2019). Rather,
censorship is triggered by other factors, such as for exam-
ple, the collective action potential (King, Pan, and Roberts
2013), i.e., censors target posts that stimulate collective ac-
tion, such as riots and protests.
The goal of this paper is to compare censored and un-
censored posts that contain the same sensitive keywords and
topics. Using the linguistic features extracted, a neural net-
work model is built to explore whether censorship decision
can be deduced from the linguistic characteristics of the
posts.
The contributions of this paper are: 1. We decipher a
way to determine whether a blogpost on Weibo has been
deleted by the author or censored by Weibo. 2. We develop
a corpus of censored and uncensored Weibo blogposts that
contain sensitive keyword(s). 3. We build a neural network
3https://www.investors.com/news/
technology/weibo-reports-first-quarter-earnings/
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classifier that predicts censorship significantly better than
non-expert humans. 4. We find a set of linguistics features
that contributes to the censorship prediction problem. 5. We
indirectly test the construct of Collective Action Potential
(CAP) proposed by King et al. (2013) through crowdsourc-
ing experiments and find that the existence of CAP is more
prevalent in censored blogposts than uncensored blogposts
as judged by human annotators.
Previous Work
There have been significant efforts to develop strategies
to detect and evade censorship. Most work, however, fo-
cuses on exploiting technological limitations with existing
routing protocols (Leberknight, Chiang, and Wong 2012;
Katti, Katabi, and Puchala 2005; Levin et al. 2015; McPher-
son, Shokri, and Shmatikov 2016; Weinberg et al. 2012).
Research that pays more attention to linguistic properties
of online censorship in the context of censorship evasion
include, for example, Safaka et al. (2016) who apply lin-
guistic steganography to circumvent censorship. Lee (2016)
uses parodic satire to bypass censorship in China and claims
that this stylistic device delays and often evades censorship.
Hiruncharoenvate et al. (2015) show that the use of homo-
phones of censored keywords on Sina Weibo could help ex-
tend the time a Weibo post could remain available online.
All these methods rely on a significant amount of human
effort to interpret and annotate texts to evaluate the likeli-
hood of censorship, which might not be practical to carry
out for common Internet users in real life. There has also
been research that uses linguistic and content clues to detect
censorship. Knockel et al. (2015) and Zhu et al. (2013) pro-
pose detection mechanisms to categorize censored content
and automatically learn keywords that get censored. King
et al. (2013) in turn study the relationship between politi-
cal criticism and chance of censorship. They come to the
conclusion that posts that have a Collective Action Poten-
tial get deleted by the censors even if they support the state.
Bamman et al. (2012) uncover a set of politically sensitive
keywords and find that the presence of some of them in a
Weibo blogpost contribute to a higher chance of the post
being censored. Ng et al. (2018) also target a set of topics
that have been suggested to be sensitive, but unlike Bam-
man et al. (2012), they cover areas not limited to politics. Ng
et al. (2018) investigate how the textual content as a whole
might be relevant to censorship decisions when both the cen-
sored and uncensored blogposts include the same sensitive
keyword(s).
Our work is related to Ng et al. (2018) and Ng et
al. (2019); however, we introduce a larger and more diverse
dataset of censored posts; we experiment with a wider range
of features and in fact show that not all the features reported
in Ng et al. guarantee the best performance. We built a clas-
sifier that significantly outperforms Ng et al. We conduct a
crowdsourcing experiment testing human judgments of con-
troversy and censorship as well as indirectly testing the con-
struct of collective action potential proposed by King et al.
Tracking Censorship
Tracking censorship topics on Weibo is a challenging task
due to the transient nature of censored posts and the
scarcity of censored data from well-known sources such
as FreeWeibo4 and WeiboScope5. The most straightforward
way to collect data from a social media platform is to make
use of its API. However, Weibo imposes various restrictions
on the use of its API such as restricted access to certain end-
points and restricted number of posts returned per request.
Above all, the Weibo API does not provide any endpoint that
allows easy and efficient collection of the target data (posts
that contain sensitive keywords). Therefore, an alternative
method is needed to track censorship for our purpose.
Datasets
Using Zhu et al. (2003)’s Corpus
Zhu et al. (2013) collected over 2 million posts published by
a set of around 3,500 sensitive users during a 2-month pe-
riod in 2012. We extract around 20 thousand text-only posts
using 64 keywords across 26 topics, which partially overlap
with those included in the New Corpus (see below and in
Table 3). We filter all duplicates. Among the extracted posts,
930 (4.63%) are censored by Weibo as verified by Zhu et al.
(2013) The extracted data from Zhu et al.(2013)’s are also
used in building classification models.
While it is possible to study the linguistic features in Zhu
et al’s dataset without collecting new data, we created an-
other corpus that targets ‘normal’ users (Zhu et al. target
‘sensitive’ users) and a different time period so that the re-
sults are not specific to a particular group of users and time.
New Corpus
Web Scraping We develop a web scraper that continu-
ously collects and tracks data that contain sensitive key-
words on the front-end. The scraper’s target interface6 dis-
plays 20 to 24 posts that contain a certain search key term(s),
resembling a search engine’s result page. We call this inter-
face the Topic Timeline since the posts all contain the same
keyword(s) and are displayed in reverse chronological or-
der. The Weibo API does not provide any endpoint that re-
turns the same set of data appeared on the Topic Timeline.
Through a series of trial-and-errors to avoid CAPTCHAs
that interrupt the data collection process, we found an op-
timal scraping frequency of querying the Topic Timeline ev-
ery 5 to 10 minutes using 17 search terms (see Appendix7)
across 10 topics (see Table 1) for a period of 4 months (Au-
gust 29, 2018 to December 29, 2018). In each query, all rele-
vant posts and their meta-data are saved to our database. We
save posts that contain texts only (i.e. posts that do not con-
tain images, hyperlinks, re-blogged content etc.) and filter
out duplicates.
4https://freeweibo.com/
5http://weiboscope.jmsc.hku.hk/
6e.g. searching "NLP" http://s.weibo.com/weibo/NLP
7https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~feldmana/
publications/aaai20_appendix.pdf
topic censored uncensored
cultural revolution 55 66
human rights 53 71
family planning 14 28
censorship & propaganda 32 56
democracy 119 107
patriotism 70 105
China 186 194
Trump 320 244
Meng Wanzhou 55 76
kindergarten abuse 48 5
Total 952 952
Table 1: Data collected by scraper for classification
Decoding Censorship According to Zhu et al. (2013), the
unique ID of a Weibo post is the key to distinguish whether
a post has been censored by Weibo or has been instead re-
moved by the authors themselves. If a post has been cen-
sored by Weibo, querying its unique ID through the API
returns an error message of “permission denied" (system-
deleted), whereas a user-removed post returns an error mes-
sage of “the post does not exist" (user-deleted). However,
since the Topic Timeline (the data source of our web scraper)
can be accessed only on the front-end (i.e. there is no API
endpoint associated with it), we rely on both the front-end
and the API to identify system- and user-deleted posts. It is
not possible to distinguish the two types of deletion by di-
rectly querying the unique ID of all scraped posts because,
through empirical experimentation, uncensored posts and
censored (system-deleted) posts both return the same error
message – “permission denied"). Therefore, we need to first
check if a post still exists on the front-end, and then send an
API request using the unique ID of the post that no longer
exists to determine whether it has been deleted by the sys-
tem or the user. The steps to identify censorship status of
each post are illustrated in Figure 1. First, we check whether
a scraped post is still available through visiting the user in-
terface of each post. This is carried out automatically in a
headless browser 2 days after a post is published. If a post
has been removed (either by system or by user), the head-
less browser is redirected to an interface that says “the page
doesn’t exist"; otherwise, the browser brings us to the orig-
inal interface that displays the post content. Next, after 14
days, we use the same methods in step 1 to check the posts’
status again. This step allows our dataset to include posts
that have been removed at a later stage. Finally, we send a
follow-up API query using the unique ID of posts that no
longer exist on the browser in step 1 and step 2 to determine
censorship status using the same decoding techniques pro-
posed by Zhu et al. as described above (2013). Altogether,
around 41 thousand posts are collected, in which 952 posts
(2.28%) are censored by Weibo. In our ongoing work, we
are comparing the accuracy of the classifier on posts that are
automatically removed vs. those removed by humans. The
results will be reported in the future publications.
We would like to emphasize that while the data collec-
tion methods could be seen as recreating a keyword search,
the scraping pipeline also deciphers the logic in discovering
censorship on Weibo.
Sample Data
Figure 2 shows several examples selected randomly from
our dataset. Each pair of censored and uncensored posts con-
tains the same sensitive keyword.
Figure 2: Sample Data
Crowdsourcing Experiment
A balanced corpus is created. The uncensored posts of each
dataset are randomly sampled to match with the number of
their censored counterparts (see Table 1 and Table 3). We
select randomly a subset of the data collected by the web
scraper to construct surveys for crowdsourcing experiment.
The surveys ask participants three questions (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Crowdsourcing experiment: Three survey ques-
tions.
Sample questions are included in Appendix8. Question
1 explores how humans perform on the task of censorship
classification; question 2 explores whether a blogpost is con-
troversial; question 3 serves as a way to explore in our data
the concept of Collective Action Potential (CAP) suggested
8http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~feldmana/
publications/aaai20_appendix.pdf
Figure 1: Logical flow to determine censorship status (Ng et al. 2018)
by King et al.(2013). According to King et al. (2013), Col-
lective Action Potential is the potential to cause collective
action such as protest or organized crowd formation outside
the Internet. Participants can respond either Yes or No to
the 3 questions above. A total of 800 blogposts (400 cen-
sored and 400 uncensored) are presented to 37 different par-
ticipants through a crowdsourcing platform Witmart9 in 8
batches (100 blogposts per batch). Each blogpost is anno-
tated by 6 to 12 participants. The purpose of this paper is to
shed light on the “knowledge gap” between censors and nor-
mal weibo users about censorable content. We believe weibo
users are aware of potential censorable content but are not
“trained” enough to avoid or identify them. The results are
summarized in Table 2.
question censored uncensored
Q1 (censorship) Yes: 23.83%No: 76.17%
Yes: 16.41%
No: 83.59%
Q2 (controversy) Yes: 61.02%No: 38.98%
Yes: 55.37%
No: 44.63%
Q3 (CAP) Yes: 6.13%No: 93.87%
Yes: 3.93%
No: 96.07%
Table 2: Crowdsourcing results
The annotation results are intuitive – participants tend
to see censored blogposts as more controversial and more
likely to trigger action in real life than the uncensored coun-
terpart.
We obtain a Fleiss’s kappa score for each question to
study the inter-rater agreement. Since the number and iden-
tity of participants of each batch of the survey are different,
we obtain an average Fleiss’ kappa from the results of each
batch. The Fleiss’ kappa of questions 1 to 3 are 0.13, 0.07,
and 0.03 respectively, which all fall under the category of
slight agreement.
We hypothesize that since all blogposts contain sensitive
keyword(s), the annotators choose to label a fair amount of
uncensored blogposts as controversial, and even as likely to
be censored or cause action in real life. This might also be
the reason of the low agreement scores – the sensitive key-
words might be the cause of divided opinions.
Regarding the result of censorship prediction, 23.83%
9http://www.witmart.com
of censored blogposts are correctly annotated as censored,
while 83.59% of uncensored blogposts are correctly anno-
tated as uncensored. This result suggests that participants
tend to predict a blogpost to survive censorship on Weibo,
despite the fact that they can see the presence of controver-
sial element(s) in a blogpost as suggested by the annotation
results of question 2. This suggests that detecting censorable
content is a non-trivial task and humans do not have a good
intuition (unless specifically trained, perhaps) what mate-
rial is going to be censored. It might be true that there is
some level of subjectivity form human censors. We believe
there are commonalities among censored blogposts that pass
through the “subjectivity filters” and such commonalities
could be the linguistic features that contribute to our experi-
ment results (see sections and ).
Feature Extraction
To build an automatic classifier, we first extract features
from both our scraped data and Zhu et al.’s dataset. While
the datasets we use are different from that of Ng et al. (2018)
and Ng et al. (2019), some of the features we extract are sim-
ilar to theirs. We include CRIE features (see below) and the
number of followers feature that are not extracted in Ng et
al. (2018)’s work.
Linguistic Features
We extract 5 sets of linguistic features from both datasets
(see below) – the LIWC features, the CRIE features, the
sentiment features, the semantic features, and word embed-
dings. We are interested in the LIWC and CRIE features be-
cause they are purely linguistic, which aligns with the objec-
tive of our study. Also, some of the LIWC features extracted
from Ng et al. (2018)’s data have shown to be useful in clas-
sifying censored and uncensored tweets.
LIWC features The English Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count (LIWC) (Pennebaker, Booth, and Francis 2017; Pen-
nebaker et al. 2015) is a program that analyzes text on a
word-by-word basis, calculating percentage of words that
match each language dimension, e.g., pronouns, function
words, social processes, cognitive processes, drives, in-
formal language use etc. Its lexicon consists of approxi-
mately 6400 words divided into categories belong to dif-
ferent linguistic dimensions and psychological processes.
LIWC builds on previous research establishing strong links
topic censored uncensored
cultural revolution 19 29
human rights 16 10
family planning 4 4
censorship & propaganda 47 38
democracy 94 53
patriotism 46 30
China 300 458
Bo Xilai 8 8
brainwashing 57 3
emigration 10 11
June 4th 2 5
food & env. safety 14 17
wealth inequality 2 4
protest & revolution 4 5
stability maintenance 66 28
political reform 12 9
territorial dispute 73 75
Dalai Lama 2 2
HK/TW/XJ issues 2 4
political dissidents 2 2
Obama 8 19
USA 62 59
communist party 37 10
freedom 12 11
economic issues 31 37
Total 930 930
Table 3: Data extracted from Zhu et al. (2013)’s dataset for
classification
between linguistic patterns and personality/psychological
state. We use a version of LIWC developed for Chinese by
Huang et al. (2012) to extract the frequency of word cate-
gories. Altogether we extract 95 features from LIWC. One
important feature of the LIWC lexicon is that categories
form a tree structure hierarchy. Some features subsume oth-
ers.
Sentiment features We use BaiduAI10 to obtain a set of
sentiment scores for each post. BaiduAI’s sentiment ana-
lyzer is built using deep learning techniques based on data
found on Baidu, one of the most popular search engines and
encyclopedias in mainland China. It outputs a positive sen-
timent score and a negative sentiment score which sum to
1.
CRIE features We use the Chinese Readability Index Ex-
plorer (CRIE) (Sung et al. 2016), a text analysis tool devel-
oped for measuring the readability of a Chinese text based
on the its linguistic components. Its internal dictionaries and
lexical information are developed based on dominant cor-
pora such as the Sinica Tree Bank. CRIE outputs 50 linguis-
tic features (see Appendix11), such as word, syntax, seman-
tics, and cohesion in each text or produce an aggregated re-
sult for a batch of texts. CRIE can train and categorize texts
based on their readability levels. We use the textual-features
10https://ai.baidu.com
11http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~feldmana/
publications/aaai20_appendix.pdf
analysis for our data and derive readability scores for each
post in our data. These scores are mainly based on descrip-
tive statistics.
Semantic features We use the Chinese Thesaurus devel-
oped by Mei (1984) and extended by HIT-SCIR12 to extract
semantic features. The structure of this semantic dictionary
is similar to WordNet, where words are divided into 12 se-
mantic classes and each word can belong to one or more
classes. It can be roughly compared to the concept of word
senses. We derive a semantic ambiguity feature by dividing
the number of words in each post by the number of semantic
classes in it.
Frequency & readability We compute the average fre-
quency of characters and words in each post using
Da (2004)13’s work and Aihanyu’s CNCorpus 14 respec-
tively. For words with a frequency lower than 50 in the ref-
erence corpus, we count it as 0.0001%. It is intuitive to think
that a text with less semantic variety and more common
words and characters is relatively easier to read and under-
stand. We derive a Readability feature by taking the mean of
character frequency, word frequency and word count to se-
mantic classes described above. It is assumed that the lower
the mean of the 3 components, the less readable a text is.
In fact, these 3 components are part of Sung et al. (2015)’s
readability metric for native speakers on the word level and
semantic level.
Word embeddings Word vectors are trained using the
word2vec tool (Mikolov et al. 2013a; 2013b) on 300,000
of the latest Chinese articles15 on Wikipedia. A 200-
dimensional vector is computed for each word of each blog-
post. The vector average of each blogpost is the sum of
word vectors divided by the number of vectors. The 200-
dimensional vector average are used as features for classifi-
cation.
Non-linguistic Features
Followers The number of followers of the author of each
post is recorded and used as a feature for classification.
Classification
Features extracted from the balanced datasets (See Table
1 and Table 3) are used for classifications. Although the
amount of uncensored blogposts significantly outnumber
censored in real-life, such unbalanced corpus might be more
suitable for anomaly detection. All numeric values of the
features have been standardized before classification. We
12Harbin Institute of Technology Research Center for Social
Computing and Information Retrieval.
13http://lingua.mtsu.edu/chinese-computing/
statistics/
14http://www.aihanyu.org/cncorpus/index.
aspx
15https://dumps.wikimedia.org/zhwiki/
latest/
use a multilayer perceptron (MLP) classifier to classify in-
stances into censored and uncensored. A number of classifi-
cation experiments using different combinations of features
are carried out.
Best performances are achieved using the combination
of CRIE, sentiment, semantic, frequency, readability and
follower features (i.e. all features but LIWC and word
embeddings) (see Table 4). The feature selection is per-
formed using random sampling. As a result 77 features
are selected that perform consistently well across the
datasets. We call these features the best features set. (see
https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~feldmana/
publications/aaai20_appendix.pdf for the full
list of features).
We vary the number of epochs and hidden layers. The rest
of the parameters are set to default – learning rate of 0.3, mo-
mentum of 0.2, batch size of 100, validation threshold of 20.
Classification experiments are performed on 1) both datasets
2) scraped data only 3) Zhu et al.’s data only. Each experi-
ment is validated with 10-fold cross validation. We report
the accuracy of each model in Table 4. It is worth mention-
ing that using the LIWC features only, or the CRIE features
only, or the word embeddings only, or all features exclud-
ing the CRIE features, or all features except the LIWC and
CRIE features all result in poor performance of below 60%.
Besides MLP, we also use the same sets of features to train
classifiers using Naive Bayes, Logistic, and Support Vector
Machine. However, the performances are all below 65%.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our best results are over 30% higher than the baseline and
about 60% higher than the human baseline obtained through
crowdsourcing, which shows that our classifier has a greater
censorship predictive ability compared to human judgments.
The classification on both datasets together tends to give
higher accuracy using at least 3 hidden layers. However,
the performance does not improve when adding additional
layers (other parameters being the same). Since the two
datasets were collected differently and contain different
topics, combining them together results in a richer dataset
that requires more hidden layers to train a better model. It
is worth noting that classifying both datasets using the best
features set decreases the accuracy, while using all features
but LIWC improves the classification performance. The
reason for this behavior could be an existence of consistent
differences in the LIWC features between the datasets. Since
the LIWC features in the best features set (see Appendix
https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~feldmana/
publications/aaai20_appendix.pdf) consist of
mostly word categories of different genres of vocabulary
(i.e. grammar and style agnostic), it might suggest that
the two datasets use vocabularies differently. Yet, the
high performance obtained excluding the LIWC features
shows that the key to distinguishing between censored and
uncensored posts seems to be the features related to writing
style, readability, sentiment, and semantic complexity of a
text.
Figure 5 shows two blogposts annotated by CRIE with
number of verbs and number of first person pronoun fea-
tures.
Figure 5: Examples of blogposts annotated by CRIE.
To narrow down on what might be the best features that
contribute to distinguishing censored and uncensored posts,
we compare the mean of each feature of the two classes
(see Figure 4). The 6 features distinguish censored from
uncensored are:
1. negative sentiment
2. average number of idioms in each sentence
3. number of content word categories
4. number of idioms
5. number of complex semantic categories
6. verbs
On the other hand, the 4 features that distinguish uncen-
sored from censored are:
1. positive sentiment
2. words related to leisure
3. words related to reward
4. words related to money
This might suggest that the censored posts generally con-
vey more negative sentiment and are more idiomatic and se-
mantically complex in terms of word usage. According to
King et al. (2013), Collective Action Potential, which is re-
lated to a blogpost’s potential of causing riot or assembly in
real-life, is the key determinant of a blogpost getting cen-
sored. Although there is not a definitive measure of this con-
struct, it is intuitive to relate a higher average use of verbs to
a post that calls for action.
On the other hand, the uncensored posts might be in gen-
eral more positive in nature (positive sentiment) and in-
clude more content that talks about neutral matters (money,
leisure, reward).
We further explore how the use of verbs might possibly
affect censorship by studying the types of verbs used in cen-
sored and uncensored blogposts. We extracted verbs from
all blogposts by using the Jieba Part-of-speech tagger 16. We
then used the Chinese Thesaurus described in Section to
16https://github.com/fxsjy/jieba
dataset N H features A P R
majority class baseline 49.98
human baseline 23.83
SVM, Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression 65%
scraped 500 50,50,50 BFS 80.36 c: 79.3u: 81.0
c: 75.1
u: 77.4
scraped 800 60,60,60 BFS 80.2 c: 81.5u: 75.5
c: 79.4
u: 79.2
Zhu et al’s 800 50,7 BFS 87.63 c: 85.9u: 86.0
c: 86.0
u: 86.0
Zhu et al’s 800 30,30 BFS 86.18 c: 85.3u: 86.2
c: 87.4
u: 86.2
both 800 60,60,60 BFS 75.4 c: 72.0u: 70.6
c: 71.9
u: 75.4
both 500 50,50,50 BFS 73.94 c: 70.7u: 71.1
c: 73.5
u: 72.0
scraped 800 30,30,30 all except LIWC& word embeddings 72.95
c: 71.8
u: 73.0
c: 75.6
u: 73.0
Zhu et al’s 800 60,60,60 all except LIWC& word embeddings 70.64
c: 89.2
u: 76.3
c: 45.4
u: 69.9
both 500 40,40,40 all except LIWC& word embeddings 84.67
c: 80.2
u: 79.9
c: 80.4
u: 79.9
both 800 20,20,20 all except LIWC& word embeddings 88.50
c: 84.6
u: 87.0
c: 80.3
u: 81.7
both 800 30,30,30 all except LIWC& word embeddings 87.04
c: 86.6
u: 86.0
c: 81.9
u: 85.8
both 800 50,50,50 all except LIWC& word embeddings 87.24
c: 83.5
u: 84.6
c: 80.8
u: 82.6
Table 4: MLP classification results. N = number of epochs, H = number of nodes in each hidden layer, A = accuracy, P =
precision, R = recall, BFS = best features set, c = censored, u = uncensored
categorize the verbs into 5 classes: Actions, Psychology, Hu-
man activities, States and phenomena, and Relations. How-
ever, no significant differences have been found across cen-
sored and uncensored blogposts. A further analysis on verbs
in terms of their relationship with actions and arousal can be
a part of future work.
Since the focus of this paper is to study the linguistic
content of blogposts, rather than rate of censorship, we did
not employ technical methods to differentiate blogposts that
have different survival rates. Future work could be done to
investigate any differences between blogposts that get cen-
sored at different rates. In our ongoing work, we are compar-
ing the accuracy of the classifier on posts that are automat-
ically removed vs. those removed by humans. The results
will be reported in the future publications.
To conclude, our work shows that there are linguistic fin-
gerprints of censorship, and it is possible to use linguistic
properties of a social media post to automatically predict if
it is going to be censored. It will be interesting to explore if
the same linguistic features can be used to predict censorship
on other social media platforms and in other languages.
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